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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
UTAH CONST. Art. I, Sect. 7 [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CONST. Art. I, Sect. 11 [Courts open -- Redress of 
injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 
78B-6-301. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court 
or its proceedings are contempts of the authority of 
the court: 
(5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or 
process of the court; 
78B-6-303. Warrant of attachment or commitment order 
to show cause. 
If the contempt is not committed in the immediate view 
and presence of the court or judge, a warrant of 
attachment may be issued to bring the person charged to 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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answer. If there is no previous arrest, a warrant of 
commitment may, upon notice, or upon an order to show 
cause, be granted. A warrant of commitment may not be 
issued without a previous attachment to answer, or a 
notice or order to show cause. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Appellee (hereafter, "Vicchrilli") initiated the 
present action to enforce a judgment for purported, 
back-child support against Appellant (hereafter 
"Tracy"). In the copy of the order to show cause served 
to Tracy on December 29, 2010, Vicchrilli redacted her 
contact information with black marker and white 
correction tape. [R. at 120.] Lacking in personam 
jurisdiction, the trial court's finding of contempt as 
well as monetary judgment against Tracy are null and 
void. 
The trial court's finding of contempt is also 
materially deficient. In particular, the trial court 
failed to determine the factual ability of Tracy to 
comply with the court order citing general employment 
statistics in the country Tracy did not reside. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The trial court's monetary judgment against Tracy 
is likewise materially deficient. In particular, the 
trial court failed to allow evidence that the minor 
child neither lived with nor received financial support 
from Vicchrilli. Moreover, the court failed to set off 
expenses Tracy made directly to his daughter for 
college expenses. 
This Court should therefore vacate the judgment 
entered by the trial court in its entirety, as well as 
grant Tracy costs and expenses on appeal. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. Vicchrilli and Tracy are the parents of Kamrie P. 
Reineccius born out of wedlock (hereafter "Kamrie"). 
Despite having a single, sexual encounter with 
Vicchrilli when he was 16 years old, Tracy voluntarily 
acknowledged paternity of Kamrie on April 4, 1990. [R. 
at 3 .] 
2. In fulfillment of the judgment entered by the trial 
court the next year [R. at 43], Tracy entered into Army 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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branch of military service and made direct payments to 
Vicchrilli without delay until 2003. 
3. On or around Kamrie's 13th birthday, Vicchrilli 
abandoned her previous place of residence and actively 
concealed both her residency as well as that of Kamrie. 
[R. at 259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 17 In. 17-21.] 
After that date, Kamrie neither resided with Vicchrilli 
nor received financial support from her. (Id.) 
4. In October 2009, after obtaining majority, Kamrie 
contacted Tracy and informed him of her current 
residence in Coeur D'Alene, Idaho. Tracy initiated 
personal contact with Kamrie on that same day and 
subsequently gave her direct financial assistance in 
order for her to attend college classes at the Northern 
Idaho University in the amount of $3,063.39. [R. at 
259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 17, In. 2-7.] 
5. Despite having failed to give Kamrie a home and 
financial support since 2003, Vicchrilli petitioned the 
trial court to enforce the child support order entered 
against Tracy nineteen years earlier. [R. at 114.] 
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I 
6. Appellant was served with Ms. Vicchrilli's petition 
' on December 29, 2 0 09 and ordered to appear before 
Commissioner Patten on January 11, 2010 in violation of 
the 14-day-notice requirement of Rule 101(b) Utah Code 
of Civil Procedure. [R. at 128.] In her petition served 
on Tracy, Vicchrilli redacted her contact information 
with a black marked and white correction tape. [R. at 
120.] Vicchrilli claimed an amount of $ 8,920.00 due to 
her and an amount of $ 2,750.00 due the Office of 
Recovery Service (hereafter "ORS"). [R. at 128.] 
8. Tracy moved to quash the service of process. [R. at 
126, Nr. 8.] Commissioner Patten failed to rule on the 
motion and instead entered a default judgment over 
appellant's alternative request for continuance. [R. at 
131.] 
9. Upon Tracy's Rule 101 (k) objection, [R. at 134) 
Judge McVey vacated the judgment and ordered a ude novo 
hearing." [R. at 147.] Tracy renewed his motion to 
quash the service of process. [R. at 216 Subhd. I.] 
Judge McVey failed to rule on the motion. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
10. At the hearing, ORS failed to appear. Upon Tracy's 
I objection as to the actual amount documented by ORS, 
the trial court noted: 
Well, I'm wondering. They're an indispensible 
party that should be present. I don't know. [R. 
at 259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 8 In. 25 - p. 9 
In. 1.] 
10. Upon Tracy's further objection as to the documents 
submitted by Vicchrilli [R. at 256, Addendum Exhib. 1 
at p. 6 In. 25 - p.8 In. 7], the trial court noted: 
Well, this does not appear to be a self-evident 
document. I mean, I can't — without some 
foundation from ORS, I'm not 100 percent sure 
what this — what they mean by this. And we've 
got a computer printout, and they've got 
payments, they've got adjustments, they've got 
a balance to date, they've taken some things 
out here, they've got a current due of $17,925. 
So I'm not quite sure what they mean by all of 
that. (R. 259, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 9 In. 
17-24) .] 
11. Despite this unresolved uncertainty, the trial 
court awarded Vicchrilli $11,670.00 to include $750.00 
in attorney fees for Vicchrilli's prior council during 
the unsuccessful proceedings before Commissioner Patten 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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> 
as well as attorney fees for the de novo hearing before 
1 Judge McVey. [R. at 2 5 0.] 
12. Over Tracy's objection that Vicchrilli had 
concealed the location of his daughter's residence and 
had thus forfeited her right to seek reimbursement for 
child support the following exchange occurred: 
MR. TRACY: ... The issue was is it was the — 
was my daughter actually under the care of the 
petitioner? 
THE COURT: Well, no. No. That doesn't matter 
either. Because the child support is for the 
benefit of the — of the minor. It's not for the 
benefit of the petitioner. [R. at 259, Addendum 
Exhib. 1 at p. 18 In. 7-12).] 
13. In finding Tracy in contempt, the trial court 
simply noted: 
The Court would also note that — find that 
respondent has not paid child support, and, 
further, with regard to his argument that he had 
not the ability to pay it, the Court would note 
that, at least from 2003 to 2007, the Court takes 
judicial notice that the unemployment rate in this 
country was around 5 percent, which economists 
indicate is zero unemployment. Now, I realize that 
that's — that's an average and that's — you know, 
that doesn't mean that everybody's employed that 
wants to be employed, but, nonetheless, there were 
plenty of opportunities for employment, at least up 
to the point where the economy south on us after 
the collapse of the housing market [R. at 259, 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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r 
Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 4 0 In. 6-17; R. at 246 Nr. 
6.] 
> 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Having failed to fulfill the legal requirements of 
a court summons as promulgated by Rule 4(c)(1) Utah 
Code of Civil Procedure, the district court was not 
vested with personal jurisdiction over Tracy. While 
this issue is dispositive of this case, this Court has 
affirmed the necessity of ruling on further merits of 
the case when the possibility of further litigation is 
anticipated. Parkside, 37 P.3d at 1208. 
The following issues are relevant in any possible 
future litigation: 
1) Can Tracy be found in contempt of court without a 
factual inquiry into his solvency? 
2) Must the trial court allow evidence that the minor 
child neither lived with nor received financial 
support from the parent claiming past arrears? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3) Must the trial court allow off-set for college 
expenses paid directly to the child after 
emanc ipat ion? 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court was Not Vested with Personal 
Jurisdiction over Tracy 
Article 1, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution 
requires that no person shall be deprived of liberty 
with the due process of law. In turn, Section 78B-6-303 
of the Utah Code Ann. provides for civil punishment for 
contempt of court. In particular, it stipulates that a 
court of competent jurisdiction must first issue an 
order to show cause. Subsequently, Rule 4(c)(1) of the 
Utah Code of Civil Procedure provides the procedural 
basis for that determination. It stipulates that 
The summons shall ... state the name, address 
and telephone number of the plaintiff's 
attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiff's 
address and telephone number. 
In the present case, the summons served on Tracy 
was defective when Vicchrilli redacted her contact 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
information. This Court has previously addressed the 
t legal consequences of such deficiencies. 
In Parkside, this Court ruled on the legal effect 
in an unlawful detainer action in which the summons 
i 
from the landlord failed to include the court's 
endorsement as required under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 
(1996). Parkside, 37 P.3d at 1202. This court noted, 
We ultimately conclude in this case that 
Tenant's timely motion to quash a defective 
summons was well-taken and precludes the trial 
court from exercising personal jurisdiction 
over Tenant. Id. 
This promulgation expressly affirmed the Utah 
Supreme Court decision in Tolbert, in which the Court 
held, "[t]he proper issuance and service of a 
summons[,] which is the means of invoking the 
jurisdiction of the court and of acquiring jurisdiction 
over the defendant, is the foundation of a lawsuit." 
Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 402 P. 2d 
704. 
Much like the language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 
directing that the "court shall indorse upon the 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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summons the number of days within which the defendant 
• is required to appear and defend the action," 
(emphasis added) as decided in Parkside, Rule 4(c)(1) 
of the Utah Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that the 
i 
party instigating contempt of court action "shall ... 
state the name, address and telephone number of the 
plaintiff's attorney, if any, and otherwise the 
plaintiff's address and telephone number" (emphasis 
added). As this Court noted in Parkside, it is not the 
prerogative of the courts to ignore legislative 
mandates." Parkside 37 P.3d at 1207. Likewise, it was 
not within prerogative of the district court to ignore 
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court or a two-thirds 
majority in both house of the Utah Legislature 
(Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII Section 4) in 
affirming the Utah Code of Civil Procedure. 
Specifically, these provisions are the very guidelines 
by which "Liberty" is guaranteed under Art. 1 Sect. 7 
of the Utah Constitution. 
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\ 
Vicchrilli, having redacted the court summon served 
on Tracy failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial 
court to adjudicate her purported claim. As such, the 
ruling of the district court is null and void. 
II. The Trial Court Failed to Determine that the 
Appellant was Factually Able to Comply with the 
Court Order and thus its Finding of Contempt is 
Null and Void. 
Because additional litigation is to be expected, 
reasons of judicial efficiency necessitate additional 
judicial guidance from this Court. 
In the case of Bartholomew, Utah Supreme Court was 
confronted with a district court's sole determination 
that uthe defendant is found in contempt of court for 
not making payments to the complaining witness." The 
Court held that, 
such a finding is wholly insufficient as a 
finding of fact and would not support the 
judgment of contempt. State v. Bartholomew, 38 
P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1934). 
The court further held that otherwise, 
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I 
the order or judgment adjudging defendant to be 
^ in contempt has no support, is without 
jurisdiction, and is null and void. 
Barthowlomew, 38 P. 2d at 755. 
j, 
As such, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed its 
holding in Kanendock. State v. Kranendock, 9 p. 2d 
> 176 (Utah 1932). 
In the present case, the trail court neither 
addressed the past or current employment of Tracy nor 
made finding of fact in support of its judgment. Under 
the binding ruling of the Utah Supreme Court, such a 
judicial determination is null and void. 
}
 III. The Trial Court Erroneously Disallowed Evidence 
that Appellee Failed to Provide a Home and 
( Financial Support to Kamrie and thus Forfeited 
Her Right to Claim Past Arrears. 
In the case of Wasescha, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed that a custodial parent forfeits her right 
to claim back child support in the case where she has 
not herself provided support and is not seeking 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reimbursement for past expenses. Wasescha v. 
Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
In the present case, the trial court erroneously 
concluded that it was not necessary for minor child to 
reside with the custodial parent in order for that 
parent to recover arrears from the non-custodial 
parent. [R. at 2 56, Addendum Exhib. 1 at p. 18 In. 7-
12.] Such a legal determination directly contradicts 
the exception recognized by the Utah Supreme Court and 
therefore denied Tracy his right to have his defense 
heard in Court as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution 
in Art. 1, Sect. 11. 
IV. The District Court Failed to Set Off Expenditures 
Made by Appellant Directly to his Daughter for 
College Expenses. 
While this issue has yet to be directly addressed by 
Utah courts, several jurisdictions have allowed for 
similar set-offs. In the case of Kinsey, the Alaska 
court ruled that no arrearages were owed when the non-
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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custodial father made cash payments directly to the 
> children for tuition and books, as well as living and 
medical expenses. Kinsey v. Kinsey, 425 So. 2d. 483 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1983). 
Likewise, in Mooty, the Florida Supreme Court found 
that the father had taken great interest in his 
daughter's education and appreciated the advantages of 
a college education. Although the parties had not 
provided for the off-set in the original divorce 
decree, the court found that the father had made a 
) great financial sacrifice which warranted reducing 
arrears owed for alimony. Mooty v. Mooty, 131 Fla. 151, 
(Fla. 1938). 
Similar rulings include, Cronebaugh v. Van Dyke, 
415 So. 2d 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1982), 
as well as Sholom v. Schlom, 149 Miss. Ill, 115 
(Miss 1928). 
* In the present case, the trial court seemed to 
follow a somewhat circular reasoning. Tracy was not 
^ allowed to set off expenses for college tuition against 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purported back arrears because he had "unclean hands" 
> (i.e., because he failed to make timely payments to 
Vicchrilli). Because child support obligations end at 
emancipation, it would be legally impossible to have 
"clean hands" to set off purported past arrears as 
recognized in the above-mentioned cases. 
It therefore remains unclear whether Utah courts 
will follow the precedence set it Florida, Mississippi 
and Alaska. Such a determination would clearly benefit 
a child, who after reach the age of emancipation must 
) make life-changing decisions as to her own uncertain 
future. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court lacked in personam jurisdiction 
over Tracy. Court should therefore vacate the judgment 
entered by the trial court in its entirety, as well as 
grant Tracy costs and expenses on appeal. Utah Rules of 
* App. Proc. 34(a)(costs on appeal). Moreover, this Court 
18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should provide the aforementioned guidance in the 
) instance of future litigation. 
Respectfully/submitted, 
Mark Tracy 
» 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: Transcript of trial court hearing from 
Monday, July 26, 2010 (R. 259) . 
I 
» 
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PROVO, UTAH; MONDAY, JULY 26, 2010, 10:14 A.M. 
-oooOooo-
THE COURT: Good morning. This is on the 
Vicchrilli against Tracy matter. It's Case No. 904400716. 
Would counsel please state your appearance? 
MR. STARR: Attorney Zachary Starr appearing for 
Rebecca Vicchrilli, who's also present, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. And Mr. Tracy? 
MR. TRACY: Mark Tracy, respondent in this matter, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. And I believe we had 
continued this hearing to determine — allow parties to look 
at the issue of the $3,000; is that correct? 
MR. STARR: Yeah, Your Honor. And I didn't hear a 
direction at the last hearing to prepare an order, although 
the docket did suggest that. No order was prepared. I 
believe that was the direction that we were to head, as well 
as the issues of contempt and appropriate sanctions. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. TRACY: If I may make a comment, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. TRACY: Also, the issue — there was a judgment 
that was issued by this Court for an amount of $8,900. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. TRACY: Leaving the $3,0 00 open. The 
3 
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petitioner in this matter actually only claimed to - to be 
making a claim of $8,900, which would reduce that sum down 
if that - if the question of the $3,000 given to my daughter 
for college, so that judgment would be appropriate at 
$5,856.61. 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding also? 
MR. STARR: Well, Your Honor, if the Court reviews 
back the file, the initial motion filed by my client — she 
was representing herself at the time she filed that — she 
did ask for a total judgment of $11,670, but she puts out to 
the side — and I'm referring to the document Motion for 
Order to Show Cause filed November 19th. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. STARR: She parses out there that a portion of 
that was actually owed directly to the State of Utah. Upon 
her speaking with the State about that but prior to the 
hearing on January 11th, she was informed that in fact 
$11,670 was owing to her. And that's what was represented 
to Comm. Patton at the hearing, which was the order of the 
Court at that time, that she was awarded $11,670. 
THE COURT: Okay. So - so the State does have a 
judgment or it does not? 
MR. STARR: The State does have an interest, but 
they did not appear. Although they were notified, they did 
not appear. 
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THE COURT: Do they have a judgment is what I'm 
asking. 
MR. STARR: They did not receive one at the 
January 11th hearing. And they were not — 
THE COURT: Okay. So the State does not have a 
judgment for any of this amount then. 
MR. STARR: No. The full $11,67 0 was awarded to 
petitioner, correct. 
THE COURT: By Comm. Patton? 
MR. STARR: By the commissioner, that's right. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. TRACY: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. TRACY: That judgment was vacated. The State 
of Utah, or is it still making that claim for $2,700? 
That's still an open case for that $2,700. That has been 
outlined by the petitioner. 
THE COURT: So is that $2,700 included in this 
$11,670 then? 
MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor. Exactly. Yes. And 
the State of Utah is seeking reimbursement for that amount. 
That's why that — that amount is still open. So that amount 
has already been paid to the — 
THE COURT: Well, that - that - they may be 
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seeking that, but have they filed a claim in this case for 
that? 
MR. STARR: 
THE COURT: 
MR. STARR: 
THE COURT: 
you believe that the 
in this case? 
MR. TRACY: 
In fact, I'd spoken 
They have not, Your Honor. 
All right. 
So our — just to be clear — 
Wait. Let me ask you, Mr. Tracy. Do 
State has filed a claim for that amount 
Yes, I believe they have, Your Honor. 
with ORS last -
THE COURT: What was the date? I didn't see one 
in here, is why I'm wondering. 
MR. TRACY: The date for? 
THE COURT: For them filing a claim. 
MR. TRACY: Actually, if you look at the 
petitioner, it's actually outlined in the supplement. There 
is a — 
THE COURT: Well, what's — what was the date that 
was filed? I mean, this is a fairly thick file; I want to 
make sure — 
MR. TRACY: If I could have you refer to the 
supplement that was supplied by the — by the petitioner last 
week. 
THE COURT: The supplemental memorandum? 
MR. TRACY: Yes. Correct, Your Honor. Exhibit 
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No. — I believe Exhibit No. 1. If you examine the judgment, 
Your Honor, the tabulations for the balance to date, you 
have the amount. The closing date case run is $8,920. The 
very last line on page 4. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. TRACY: And then the balance to date, $2,750, 
that — that amount is still open with the ORS services and 
still claimed by them. 
THE COURT: Well, it may be open, but what I'm 
wondering, ORS — ORS can try and collect that but they don't 
have a judgment for that in this case. And they don't have 
a — they have not made a claim for that in this case. And 
they haven't filed a separate case with the court seeking to 
enforce that amount; is that correct? 
MR. TRACY: Well, I understand, Your Honor, but 
the — that amount was paid directly to the petitioner, and 
they're seeking reimbursement. So, basically, the 
petitioner has already received that amount from the State 
of Utah and ORS is seeking to reimburse that amount that was 
already given to her. So petitioner in that instance would 
actually be compensated double for that amount. 
THE COURT 
MR. TRACY 
THE COURT 
MR. TRACY 
For the $10,900? 
No. For the $2,750. 
And is that the - so $2,750. 
Correct. 
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THE 
67 0 she's 
State for 
MR. 
COURT: And so you're saying 
claiming, she's already been 
$2,750; 
TRACY: 
is that correct? 
Correct, Your Honor. 
that she would be claiming would be $8,920 
she 
the 
Mr. 
bel. 
owec 
listed ve: 
court. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
Starr? 
MR. 
ry, very 
COURT: 
TRACY: 
COURT: 
STARR: 
that, out of this 
compensated by 
And the amount 
, which, again, 
correctly on her initial petition to 
Okay. 
Minus her contact information. 
Okay. Is that your 
It's not, Your Honor 
Lef is that petitioner is owed $11,670 
3, on top of that, the amount that my c 
understanding, 
Again, we — our 
and the State is 
lient was informed 
of was the $2,750. So we believe that the total amount is 
actually $14,000 plus, but a portion of that, the $2,750, is 
the State's right to make a claim for that, not my client's. 
When we're looking at that exhibit that was 
attached to our supplemental draft, that in fact is not the 
last line. When you go down to the very bottom, it looks 
like there's a number there showing that the adjustments — I 
mean, these are always difficult to read and it's difficult 
to determine without ORS present, but, essentially, when you 
go back through this ledger — 
THE COURT: Well, I'm wondering. They're an 
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, is the — on page 3; is 
can we go — 
MR. STARR: 
Page 4. 
THE COURT: 
be present. I don't know. 
exhibit, the $10,990, I 
that what you're referring 
No. There's 
Page 4. 
They got adjustments of 
just closed 
MR. STARR: 
that out? 
Yeah. I 
happened. And the minor child 
THE COURT: Well, thi 
And 
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Is 
bel 
one 
the 
,828 
bhat 
ieve 
more page, Your 
— shows the balance — 
Is 
what 
that 
emancipated : 
s — 
that because 
they're saying? 
s what's 
m July of 2008 -
MR. STARR: — and so some activity which happened 
subsequent to that appears to be their own office 
adjustments and other things of that nature, which I'm not 
exactly clear on how they — 
THE COURT: Well, this does not appear to be a 
self-evident document. I mean, I can't — without some 
foundation from ORS, I'm not 100 percent sure what this — 
what they mean by this. And we've got a computer printout, 
and they've got payments, they've got adjustments, they've 
got a balance to date, they've taken some things out here, 
they've got a current due of $17,925. So I'm not quite sure 
what they mean by all of that. 
MR. STARR: Suffice it to say, Your Honor, to the 
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extent that you're willing to recognize the proceedings 
which did happen before the commissioner, there — there was 
some corrections made to the petitioner's motion, and ORS 
was notified, did not appear. 
And if you go through and look at actually the 
payments that were received, we have a bunch of zeros. We 
have three $110 payments, which we understand were made by 
respondents to petitioner through ORS. But calculating that 
out, petitioner's claim before Comm. Patton was that she was 
owed $11,670, exclusive of any interest, exclusive of any 
claims by ORS or the State of Utah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STARR: And that was the judgment that was 
awarded at that hearing and, you know, we — we entered, I 
believe, at our hearing last month, Your Honor entered an 
order of $8,670 and reserved the right to argue the 
additional $3,000, which we'll do today. 
THE COURT: Right. I believe that's correct. 
Okay. 
All right. You can proceed on the three — 
MR. TRACY: If I could interject one last thought, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. Uh-huh. 
MR. TRACY: What the petitioner has requested was 
very, very clearly outlined in our original petition; i.e., 
10 
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$2,700 — or $2,700 for ORS and then eight — this exact 
amount that's listed here, $8,920 due to her. So her 
petition actually coincides with the document before the 
Court. 
THE COURT: What's the date of the petition? 
MR. TRACY: The date of the original petition, I 
believe, was November 17th, correct? 
MR. STARR: I believe he's referring to the motion 
for order to show cause, Your Honor. 
MR. TRACY: The original motion, yes, Your Honor. 
MR. STARR: November 19th, 2009. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TRACY: If there was a change from that, that 
would be a modification of the original petition, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: I am not seeing where that amount is 
specified in this petition or — I've got an order to show 
cause, I've got a — 
MR. TRACY: The counsel for the petitioner has a 
copy of that. 
THE COURT: I've got an - I've got an affidavit in 
support of the motion for order to show cause. I've got — 
she doesn't really specify an amount, other than to say 
that's — behind. I've got — 
MR. TRACY: Your Honor -
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THE COURT: —I've got a motion for order to show 
cause, which — 
MR. STARR: That's it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: — they've used this form, which is 
outdated. We don't do these anymore. But, anyway. So 
they've got unpaid child support for $11,670, and she's got 
eighty-nine twenty owed to Rebecca Vicchrilli, $2,750 owed 
to State of Utah. Okay. And then — but now you're claiming 
there's another $3,000, right? 
MR. STARR: Yeah. Our argument and our statement 
today is that this was filed in November without — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. STARR: — the assistance of counsel. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. STARR: But she did this under belief. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STARR: That's what ORS had said. She went 
back and spoke to them, corrected that at the hearing, which 
is why the order which wasn't actually filed and entered by 
this Court until, looks like, April 9th of 2010. The actual 
order which was submitted to this Court shows that she was 
awarded $11,670. 
So, although her original motion did have an 
erroneous calculation, she corrected that at the hearing. 
That was presented to the commissioner, and that was found -
12 
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay. I 
understand. So the amount at issue today is $3,000, and 
then we're still looking at the issue of contempt? 
MR. STARR: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STARR: Contempt and appropriate sanctions, as 
well as attorneys' fees — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. STARR: — were also reserved for today's 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay. You can 
proceed then. Thank you. 
MR. STARR: Well, Your Honor, maybe we should just 
start with — with that $3,000 payment. 
This is payment which Mr. Tracy argues he made 
directly to the parties' minor daughter — I'm sorry, adult 
daughter after she had become an adult. And as we have 
outlined in our supplemental memorandum, this — this payment 
actually cannot constitute payment of back-due child 
support. 
There was no agreement, there was no writing that 
would serve as a credit or as an offset to that amount. 
And has Your Honor had a chance to review this 
brief? Did you receive it timely? 
THE COURT: Yes. Well, wasn't the original 
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decree, didn't it require that payments be made to your 
client? I mean, no payments were authorized to be made 
directly to the minor child, correct? 
That's correct, Your Honor. 
Okay. 
Typical — typical order. 
Right. Okay. 
Has Your Honor had a chance to review 
MR. STARR: 
THE COURT: 
MR. STARR: 
THE COURT: 
MR. STARR: 
the brief? I '11 -
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. STARR: Okay. 
THE COURT: Well, I got your courtesy copy. I 
don't know if the original ever made it to the file, but I 
got the courtesy copy, so... 
MR. STARR: Okay. I'll be brief in my argument 
then. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STARR: Not to repeat too much. 
As stated in our brief and as well as Your Honor 
knows in case law, that statute requires a waiver in writing 
in order to forgive back — back-due child support in order 
for that to be effective. 
The respondent has not argued that there was any 
agreement, that there was any writing or that there was any 
verbal waiver of that; rather, that he just made the payment 
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directly to his daughter as an adult. And I believe such 
would be construed as a gift. To allow otherwise would — 
would be to take away the petitioner's right to receive 
support which she provided during the child's minority. 
Any further questions or clarifications needed by 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: What about the argument in the 
respondent's memorandum that the effect — I think what he's 
saying is that the petitioner made it difficult for him to 
make payments because she concealed her residency? I think 
that's the — the gist of what he's saying. Maybe he's just 
saying he was denied contact with the child, which, of 
course, wouldn't excuse responsibility to provide support. 
What about that issue? 
MR. STARR: Well, that's my understanding, that he 
simply was making a — an argument that it was not fair that 
he shouldn't have the contact that he desired with his 
daughter and, therefore, should be excused from that 
payment. 
And, also, it doesn't really apply in this case, 
when ORS was involved. If he's claiming that her 
whereabouts were unknown, thus making it difficult to make 
direct payment, but ORS has been involved in this matter for 
quite some time. And the amounts that we're seeking in 
back-due support date back to 2003. So her moving would not 
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have mattered; ORS would have had constant communication and 
contact with her. And, in fact, there were three payments 
made of $110 each in 2007. Those reached petitioner. 
So that would be our response to that argument. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Mr. Tracy? 
MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor. 
The crux of that argument concerns, Your Honor, 
and even in this case, as in the case from up till 2004, 
actually, I believe, not 2003, is that the location of both 
the petitioner and my daughter was completely unknown. I 
had no way of knowing if they were even residing in the 
state of Utah. 
Every — every indication that we had was 
actually — was that my daughter was not residing in the 
state of Utah, and that was in the original jurisdiction of 
the Court. 
When my daughter finally — 
THE COURT: And this began in 2 0 03, you're saying? 
MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor. Up 
until that point, every payment had been made, every — every 
instance of employment was reported to ORS. 
THE COURT: Were you — and you were paying ORS at 
the time? 
MR. TRACY: Yes, I was. Yes. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
2 MR. TRACY: And during that time, again, once my 
3 daughter's whereabouts were made known to me, it was 
4 actually in Coeur d1 Alene, Idaho. I immediately drove to 
5 Coeur d1 Alene, Idaho to see my daughter, ascertain her 
6 whereabouts, find out how she was doing. That's a 13-hour 
7 drive. Drug my new wife along with me on that trip. 
8 J Through the years, we had had — 
How old was your daughter in 2003? 
She was 18 years old, Your Honor. 
Okay. 
Oh, 2003, she was 13 years old, Your 
9 THE COURT 
10 MR. TRACY 
11 THE COURT 
12 MR. TRACY 
13 Honor. 
14 THE COURT: 13. Okay. Thank you. 
15 MR. TRACY: That's correct. 
16 Through the years, the respondent has actually 
17 concealed her location through those — that time, because 
18 she was very worried that she would lose the custody of her 
19 daughter. That was — we discovered, for instance, during 
20 her high school years, that respondent wasn't even listed 
21 as -
22 THE COURT: Now, how is any of this relevant? 
23 Because the child support is intended to support the 
24 daughter not the respondent, not the petitioner — 
25 MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: — and the law in this state, anyway, 
is that the things that the petitioner does doesn't excuse 
away the obligation to pay child support. 
MR. TRACY: May I come to the podium, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MR. TRACY: Thanks. 
The issue was is it was the — was my daughter 
actually under the care of the petitioner? 
THE COURT: Well, no. No. That doesn't matter 
either. Because the child support is for the benefit of 
the — of the minor. It's not for the benefit of the 
petitioner. 
MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So that's why ORS collects it. And so 
that's the issue. 
MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay? So whether she's actually under 
the respondent's care — or the — I'm sorry, the petitioner's 
care doesn't really matter because — because the obligation 
is to the daughter and the petitioner cannot, by her 
actions, waive the obligation for you to pay child support. 
MR. TRACY: Absolutely, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay? All right. 
MR. TRACY: I agree with that point exactly. And 
that is the point. 
18 
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1 In the case here in Utah of — the last case 
2 mentioned in my briefing, which was — which is actually the 
3 one in Utah court, rulings of Waschesa v. Waschesa, is 
4 Exhibit 8. In that case, Your Honor, the Utah court denied 
5 arrears to the mother because the mother had not been 
6 providing support — any type of support to the daughter. 
7 And in that case, she did not claim to be seeking 
8 reimbursement for — for payments that were made for the 
9 daughter. In that case, the court denied back arrears — 
10 THE COURT: Now, how does that relate to this 
11 $3,000 though? Because, here, you're seeking a credit for 
12 that; you're not seeking — that's — that was your argument, 
13 anyway, is you were seeking a credit for that. 
14 MR. TRACY: For the $3,000, yes. 
15 THE COURT: For three thousand, right? 
16 MR. TRACY: Correct. Now, in the case - maybe I'm 
17 just confusing the issue and I need to be clear about what 
18 I'm speaking about. If we're talking about the child 
19 support that was due from 2002 — or excuse me, 2003 until 
20 2008, like I - like I stated, Your Honor, I had absolutely 
21 no way to make payments, I had no idea if my daughter was 
22 residing in the state of Utah. 
23 THE COURT: Well, you could have paid ORS, right? 
24 MR. TRACY: And I paid the amounts that I could at 
25 that particular point in time, Your Honor. 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE COURT: Well -
MR. TRACY: The $110, which was given — which was 
given at that time — 
THE COURT: Well, I realize you're saying that you 
didn't have any money, but that's no excuse either, because, 
unless you get the order modified, that's the amount you 
have to pay. 
MR. TRACY: We actually did seek. In the case 
file, you'll see a petition by an attorney, Ms. Mary Brown, 
who actually, in 2004, actually tried to find the respondent 
in order to modify the child support. 
THE COURT: But she never -
MR. TRACY: Correct, she never did modify it, yes, 
sir. 
THE COURT: - no court ever modified the child 
support 
MR. TRACY: She did not, no. 
THE COURT: Right. Okay. 
MR. TRACY: But that's just to show that efforts 
had been made to actually make those payments, have it 
modified, and she could not be served because we did not 
know her location at that time. Even in this case, Your 
Honor, again, her contact information, tried to conceal. 
And that has been consistent. 
Now, the issue on the - the $3,000 that was given 
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directly to my daughter, the petitioner cites Utah Code, 
which can certainly be read as a rule of evidence. Any 
estoppel or waiver has to be in writing. 
The Utah courts have been silent on the issue; 
other state courts have been very explicit in allowing this 
type of setoff for payments that are made directly to the 
daughter by the father, even though they are emancipated. 
In Florida, in Maryland and also in Mississippi, 
for instance, Your Honor, the courts have allowed that. And 
I think it's a very — it's a very important decision to make 
in saying, well, there's a difference between a gift; i.e., 
is the minor given a wave runner or is she actually given 
the means to actually make important life choices? And 
college education is certainly one of those. 
THE COURT: But the - I guess the distinction here 
is — at least what I understand is that she's not a minor 
when she receives this $3,000. 
MR. TRACY: Correct. Nor, in the other cases were 
they minors. They were actually in college, and the courts 
allowed that setoff. 
THE COURT: Well, they might have been in college, 
but I don't know that they were emancipated. I mean, you 
can be in college — the — in those cases, did it say that 
the — did it say how old the children were? 
MR. TRACY: Absolutely, Your Honor. Yes, they 
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were emancipated. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TRACY: In every case cited. And there's — 
there's four cases that were actually cited in this case. 
As the Utah courts have been silent on this issue — and I 
think an important distinction needs to be made. In fact, 
in this case, I think it is very, very clear what — what has 
happened. I'm going to say something which might embarrass 
the petitioner, but it's entirely correct. She's been 
married four times, she has five children from — 
MR. STARR: Objection, Your Honor. This is 
irrelevant to the issue of support. 
THE COURT: How is any of this relevant? 
MR. TRACY: Because the idea is — 
THE COURT: And why would that have any influence 
on my decision whatsoever? The fact that she's been 
married — 
MR. TRACY: Your Honor -
THE COURT: - four times and has five children? 
Why would that even begin to influence the legal decision 
that the Court has to make? 
MR. TRACY: Because -
THE COURT: Why would this be offered for anything 
other than to impeach the character — 
MR. TRACY: If I could continue, Your Honor, I 
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think I can answer that question. 
THE COURT: Well, you can continue, but I'm just 
asking you to answer my question before you continue. 
MR. TRACY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay? 
MR. TRACY: The welfare of my daughter is at 
stake. And I had a choice when I made that payment to her 
for college. Either I could give it directly to her mother 
and then hope that it would go to my daughter. My daughter 
wished to go to college, said she could not afford to go to 
college, couldn't afford the living expenses associated with 
college. 
I was left with a decision at that particular 
point in time. I had very little credit left available to 
me. I could give that to the petitioner and then hope that 
it would reach my daughter. The factual situation is it 
would not. The factual situation is that she has not been 
encouraging at all for my daughter to — to not be on state 
welfare, to actually get an education, find training so she 
might have specific life opportunities herself. And I was 
in a situation and I decided to give it directly to my 
daughter because that was in the best interest of the child 
that has now been emancipated. 
THE COURT: Who is no longer a child. 
MR. TRACY: Correct, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go ahead, please. 
MR. TRACY: I believe that, in answer to this 
question by the Utah courts, is very important also for a 
policy point of view in that, again, emancipated child, this 
idea, this — that one day she's a child and under the care 
of the State and the next day, she's 18 and kind of off on 
her own, that it's still the — not only was the $3,000 
should be credited any type of judgment that would — for 
back arrears, it also shows every attempt that was made on 
my part to provide for the welfare of my daughter. And that 
comes also into play in the issue of contempt of court, 
which is a separate issue that — that we're not addressing 
right now; I understand that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT Okay. 
MR. TRACY: I have nothing further to say. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. STARR: Your Honor, may I respond briefly 
while we're on the issue of the $3,000? 
THE COURT: You may. Uh-huh. 
MR. STARR: Clearly, there is a petition to modify 
located in the Court's file that was never followed up with 
any order, and if petitioner were difficult to find or to be 
served, there could have been an order seeking alternative 
service. The Court probably would have granted that if 
evidence had been provided, but that didn't happen. And so, 
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1 without a modification, the current orders of the Court 
2 stood. And that original child support order which was 
3 entered in 1995 remained until the child became an adult. 
4 And the fact that — that she's now an adult just 
5 waives the argument, because the time has passed, there's no 
6 modification to be had at this point in time. The arrears 
7 are what they are. 
8 As to the issue of whether or not payment to an 
9 adult child should constitute payment to the petitioner, 
10 well, that would completely obliterate and usurp the rights 
11 of the petitioner as a parent, who previously provided 
12 support. She was the one who stood in place of the 
13 respondent and made payments on a monthly basis. And so now 
14 to avoid paying her as a creditor, in a sense, as our courts 
15 and our cases have noticed, would deny her of any and all 
16 rights. I don't think that's what our case law indicates is 
17 proper. 
18 Your Honor, any other questions or facts that need 
19 to be clarified from your perspective? 
20 THE COURT: Did you want to address the Waschesa 
21 case that was cited? 
22 MR. STARR: I do. Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 The Waschesa case is distinguishable because, in 
24 J that case, the court found the mother, in her pleadings, had 
l 
25 I admitted that she did not need the support, that there had 
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been other circumstances where the children were well 
provided for. And the court found that dubious to — to 
suggest that on one hand and yet, on the other hand, seek 
contempt and seek a judgment. And I believe that's — 
THE COURT: Hasn't this case been abrogated by 
statute anyway that — and by subsequent rulings of the Court 
that would state that — that the paying parent still has to 
pay — have to pay. I mean, even if — even if the child has 
some type of a million dollar trust from a stepparent, they 
have to pay until they get the order modified. 
MR. STARR: Correct. There is a common law duty 
of support which is there, and there's only two ways I'm 
aware of that this back due amount goes away, and that is, 
one, voluntary written waiver by the obligee — in this case 
petitioner — or, two, seek a court order modifying such. 
And neither of those happened in this case. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Anything else, then? 
MR. TRACY: Yes, Your Honor. That is correct, but 
there is one — one instance that has been forgotten or 
overlooked in this case. 
In the case of Hamilton v. Hamilton, the court 
still has discretion to make — to make changes to arrears. 
And even though the back child support cannot be 
retroactively changed, the arrears that have accrued over 
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time is in the discretion of the court, and I believe the 
child's welfare in that case, the court can use discretion 
determining how much arrears are going to be owed. 
THE COURT: Well, I think you're correct, there's 
somewhat of an equitable proceeding. On the other hand, it 
is a matter committed to the Court's sound discretion. And 
let me find the Hamilton case here. You cited that, 
correct? You've cited that in your pleadings? 
MR. TRACY: It actually came from the petitioner's 
side, Your Honor, in the supplemental. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STARR: Your Honor, we cited that on page 5 in 
support of our argument that the Court has discretion for 
other matters which we'll address shortly. 
THE COURT: Right. Okay. Got a 13-year-old case? 
Okay. All right. 
Well, in this case, the Court finds that, at the 
time that the child reached the age of majority that 
respondent was in arrears on child support; that the Office 
of Recovery Services was making some effort to collect those 
arrears, and then — and then, that it is undisputed that, 
after the child did — was emancipated that respondent gave 
her $3,000 for school. 
Based on those facts and the application of the 
law, the Court determines that that money was paid directly 
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to the child, who was then no longer a child; it was paid — 
not paid pursuant to the decree as ordered; and that there 
was no written waiver; and that — further, that the — that — 
further, that respondent should not be given credit for that 
because he's coming before the Court with unclean hands, 
being in arrears. The Court is a strong believer that 
people who bring children into the world should be 
responsible to support them. 
And I would also note that, even when the 
petitioner allegedly went into hiding, it looks like there 
was some arrearage involved at that point. So with, also, 
unclean hands at that point. Respondent certainly could 
have located petitioner with a little bit of effort. ORS 
knew where she was, and while I don't condone hiding 
children, still, the right to receive support is the 
child's, and the court jealously guards that right on behalf 
of our children in the state of Utah. 
So the $3,000 would not be allowed to be a credit 
against the arrearages, which amount to $11,170 — $11,670, 
and petitioner would be entitled to a judgment in that 
amount. 
Now, the — having an arrearage on child support is 
almost, per se, contempt, but I'll allow the parties to 
address that issue at this point. And what sanctions, if 
any, should be imposed, if the Court does conclude that 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there is contempt. 
MR. STARR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
As stated in our brief, there's a three-prong test 
that is required in the state of Utah to find someone in 
contempt. You first have to find that the party knew the 
order, knew what was required. Second, that the party had 
the ability to comply and, three, that the party willfully 
failed to obey the court orders. 
I don't think there's any — any argument on 
respondent's side today that he knew of the court order. He 
was served, he accepted service, the judgment was entered in 
1995, which was the child support order throughout this 
period of time. He was aware of it; he communicated with 
ORS; he made partial payments — three payments of $110 
during that time. So I believe the first prong is 
established. 
As to the — as to the second prong, whether or not 
there's an ability — I think this is where the contention 
lies — and our court — our case law is clear that you can 
have a defense of inability to comply with the court order; 
however, the Kesimakus case, as we briefed, requires that 
that defense is only effective where the person charged 
exercises due diligence. And I think Your Honor has already 
noted that that has not happened in this case, that — that 
respondent has not made — he did not make a serious effort 
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through the years to make payments. There was a bunch of 
zeros showing up through the months and through the years. 
And, you know, we — we don't often understand 
zeros. If there had been some attempt, fifty, forty, a 
hundred here and there, perhaps this defense of inability 
would — would be a bit more pressing on the Court. But, 
given the fact that there's very little support having been 
paid through the years, I believe that that defense is 
ineffective under the Kesimakus holding. 
Comm. Patton cited the Mansel v. Smith and the 
Proctor cases at the — at the order to show cause hearing 
back in January. Respondent seems to argue that those are 
not applicable in a contempt proceeding; rather, those apply 
in establishing an amount of child support. Be that as it 
may, it's very clear from those cases, the holdings there, 
that one cannot be voluntarily underemployed or unemployed 
to avoid a child support payment. And, certainly, as was 
cited in our brief, in the Ozmus case, a party does not have 
the right to sacrifice the rights of the parties that he's 
obligated to support by engaging in underemployment or 
furthering his or her education; providing support for 
children is his first duty. And that's exactly what we have 
here. 
Respondent, in effect, although he argues he has 
been working overseas, working in lower-paying jobs now, 
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attending school, he's — he's held the previous child's 
right — and now petitioner's right — held them hostage to 
receiving that support. This has been going on for a number 
of years. And this was a voluntary choice of his, to 
further his education, to seek a specific type of 
employment. And this intentional deprivation of his court-
ordered obligation should not be taken lightly by this 
court. 
It's fairly clear as well that there may be 
something else going on, which I think Mr. Tracy has alluded 
to in his argument today. We've attached to our 
supplemental memorandum a telephone note from ORS that 
indicates that he spoke with an agent at ORS and stated, 
quote, that: "He doesn't want to pay. He insists the child 
is not living with the custodial parent, he never gets to 
see the child." 
As Your Honor has noted, the time has passed to 
make arguments about custody and visitation rights, but, 
clearly, the child support issue itself is still present 
before this Court. I believe his statements there 
constitute a willful refusal to obey the child support 
obligation that was ordered by this Court. 
And so the fact is he did retain the legal 
ability. Whether or not he personally chose to exercise 
that ability to its fullest is irrelevant; the child was 
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owed a duty to support; petitioner is now owed a duty for 
compensation. And I believe that satisfies the second and 
third prong of — of the requirements to find someone in 
contempt. 
We have — we have requested some specific relief, 
Your Honor. Would you like to reserve that and stay on this 
point for now, or should I carry on with those points? 
THE COURT: You may carry on with that. 
MR. STARR: Well, given that a judgment has been 
ordered by Your Honor today, we're asking the Court to 
exercise its discretion — as the Hamilton case noted — to 
order minimum monthly payments. Otherwise, petitioner will 
walk out of the courtroom today with a judgment but, in 
theory, not much ability to collect on that. And there's no 
indication from the previous history that respondent will 
pay petitioner that amount. There's been years and years 
and years of opportunity to do so, and it has not happened. 
And so we're asking the Court to exercise its 
discretion, pursuant to statute and pursuant to case law, to 
sentence the respondent to jail and to enter those 
sanctions, but to stay the sentence upon his compliance, and 
to establish a minimum amount of payment to be paid to 
petitioner each month. 
We suggest a minimum of $25 0, but even under that 
amount, it will take over four years — or close to four 
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years to pay petitioner this amount that was just awarded 
her. Doing so will incentivize respondent to make those 
payments and to give him a reason to not fail to make them. 
It's the practice of this Court, certainly in the 
commissioners' courtrooms, often to schedule a review 
hearing, say, 90, 120 days out to review the payments that 
have or have not been made, and if respondent is not current 
in his payments at that time, this Court would have 
authority to execute the jail sentence. And perhaps that is 
the approach that we would request this Court take at this 
time. This is granted explicitly in Vonhenk v. Thomas, as 
we've cited in our brief, and this type of remedy, I 
believe, will — will help petitioner receive the relief that 
she's actually seeking, which is not just a judgment, but to 
be compensated. 
We've also requested attorney fees. Petitioner 
did acquire the assistance of counsel for purposes of the 
hearing in January, and she was awarded an amount, $750, by 
Comm. Patton at that time. She's seeking reimbursement of 
that amount. She's also seeking reimbursement of my fees 
and costs incurred to represent her at this objection and 
de novo hearing. 
I have not submitted an affidavit of fees because 
I was unclear how long today's hearing would take or whether 
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Your Honor would ask me to prepare an order on the hearing, 
but I certainly can submit that after. And we would ask 
that that — that those amounts of attorneys' fees would be 
added on top of the judgment previously awarded. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Tracy? 
MR. TRACY: Your Honor, since my daughter came 
into the world, I have used every means available to me. At 
16 years old, I was working midnight shifts at a supermarket 
in order to comply with the court's judgment at that time. 
Also, reimburse for the birth of my daughter in the amount 
of $1,000. 
I entered into military service for five years, 
completed a bachelor's and master's degree while working — 
while working full time to supply — to — to comply with that 
judgment. Throughout the years, up to 2003, completing a 
master's degree, also working full time. 
In the amount of time that I was in Germany from 
2000, for the length of my legal studies in Germany, I 
worked as an arms control specialist for the U.S. Army in 
Europe, liaison officer with the U.S. Army, and also the — 
THE COURT: What years was that? 
MR. TRACY: That was 2 0 02, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So you finished in 2002? When were 
you discharged? 
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MR. TRACY: I was discharged from the Army in 
1996, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. TRACY: So from 1990 - from 1990, when my 
daughter was born, till she was emancipated in 2002, any 
time that I have been employed I have made child support 
payments to my daughter. Again, as I stated — 
THE COURT: So you've not been employed, really, 
since 2003, then? 
MR. TRACY: 2 0 03. I - when I was - 2003, from 
2003 to 2005 - excuse me, Your Honor. From 2005 to 2007, I 
worked as a clerk with the district court in Heidelberg, 
Germany, with a compensation of one thousand — approximately 
$1,000 per month from the court. That was required to 
complete the legal education in Germany. 
After the completion of the first bar exam, they 
require a second bar exam, two years working for the courts. 
That's what I was remunerated. It was barely enough to 
cover my own expenses. 
Since my daughter's been emancipated in 2008 and 
before, actually, this petition was filed with this court, I 
enrolled in the School of Law at the University of San 
Diego. Again, that was after the time — this was actually 
before the time of the petition in front of this court. 
Substantial student loans have been taken. 
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They've been listed in the — in the petition before this 
Court, of $20,000. Should I actually stop legal education 
at this time — and, again, $20,000 has just been paid in 
tuition costs for next semester. I am limited in my living 
expenses to what the University of San Diego certifies and 
also what the U.S. Department of education allows for living 
expenses, which barely covers the living expenses at this 
particular point in time. 
If I were to discontinue my legal education at the 
University of San Diego, Your Honor, I would be — I would 
have to begin paying back those immediately. And without 
actually completing the legal education would be a huge 
disadvantage of about $30,000. 
I, again, offered during the last hearing with 
Mr. — with Counsel — the petitioner to make minimum payments 
until law school was completed, and then expedite — balloon 
payment at the completion of the education. This would 
enable me to be in a position to — to not — as the 
petitioner cites to some nebulous "I'll make a lot of money 
in the future," I am a trained attorney, I'm unable to 
practice my profession in the United States, my place of 
residency currently, and for that reason, the Court should 
allow me to continue that legal education. 
THE COURT: But you could - you could do that in 
Germany, though, I presume. 
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MR. TRACY: Practice my — 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. TRACY: As the Court well knows, at the end of 
my legal education, I clerked for a law firm in Germany in 
the banking and finance sector. This sector completely 
dried up and there was no employment, not for new clerks; 
they weren't hiring any — any associates, and that situation 
has not changed currently, Your Honor. 
My wife is a resident here in Utah. I decided to 
return to the United States, and that's why I am in the 
United States, to be with my wife. We were separated for 
two years during my clerkship in Germany. 
So for that, we ask that the — the Court should 
impose a burden, a monthly burden, that it would be low 
enough that I could continue my legal education. 
As far as the issue of contempt goes, as mentioned 
by the Court during the last hearing, the petitioner's 
already secured the — receiving that amount of the judgment 
in that I am unable to practice my profession until that 
judgment would be — would be tilled. So she's already 
secured that — she's already secured payment at the end of 
the legal education. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Any response? 
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MR. STARR: Yeah. I think what I heard from - or 
from respondent's argument is that he's had the ability. 
May not have been the ability, the income that he would have 
liked, but he retained the ability to work, to be employed; 
he did not seek to change the court order and the court 
order is what it is, and we're now seeking to compensate 
petitioner. And that's really the heart of the matter, why 
we're here today, Your Honor. 
I think I heard respondent admit that he would 
agree to make some minimum payments. I guess the question 
is how much. We don't have any financial declaration or 
statements or anything that would indicate what his budget 
might be. He indicated that he received a disbursement from 
the student loan. 
You know, Your Honor, I worked two years during my 
law school experience, as well as went to school full time, 
and I don't think they would have appreciated that had they 
known, but I did because I had to. I had to support my 
family. And I'm not sure what respondent's opportunities 
are, but he's — he's certainly capable of doing something 
and making some minimum payments. 
And I think we ought to separate these parties. 
They're connected by one last issue, and I think they'd, 
otherwise, rather be alone and move on with their separate 
lives and to — to have minimum payments coming in will 
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extend their relationship far beyond what either of them 
desire at this point in time, and may just extend the 
litigation, should other circumstances arise that require us 
to visit the Court again and incur more legal fees and costs 
and problems. 
So, again, we would recommend a minimum of $250 a 
month payment. If respondent is willing to agree to a 
balloon payment at the end, commencement of his law school 
experience, that may expedite it shortly, as I believe he 
has two years remaining to complete that. Maybe actually 
more like 18 months or so. That might shorten it as well. 
Our requests remain the same. I didn't hear any 
argument with regard to attorney fees. I would just like to 
add to that argument statute Code 3 0-3-3 separates an award 
of attorney fees at the outset of a case versus in an 
enforcement proceeding. And the statute is clear and 
directs the Court that, when there is a party who has 
substantially prevailed on the issues, they bring an 
enforcement proceeding, that the court is fully authorized 
to award their fees. And I believe that petitioner has 
substantially prevailed on her claims in this matter and, 
therefore, the Court should enter attorney fees on that 
basis. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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The Court finds in this case that the respondent 
was aware of his child support obligation, as stated in the 
decree of divorce. There's no — doesn't seem to be any 
dispute there. The fact is that he did make three sporadic 
payments since 2003 of $110. 
The Court would also note that — find that 
respondent has not paid child support, and, further, with 
regard to his argument that he had not the ability to pay 
it, the Court would note that, at least from 2003 to 2007, 
the Court takes judicial notice that the unemployment rate 
in this country was around 5 percent, which economists 
indicate is zero unemployment. Now, I realize that that's 
a — that's an average and that's — you know, that doesn't 
mean that everybody's employed that wants to be employed, 
but, nonetheless, there were plenty of opportunities for 
employment, at least up to the point where the economy went 
south on us after the collapse of the housing market. 
The Court would note that, looking at the records 
of — of ORS which have been supplied, although those aren't 
entirely clear in every — what each column is, they are 
clear that the — the payments — the payment column shows 
zero, with the exception of three dates, 2-5-2007, 3-8-2007, 
and 4-9-2007. And as judges, at least in this court, are 
fond of saying, we don't understand zeroes. I could 
understand if there were some $40, $50, $100 payments for a 
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substantial portion of this time; we don't understand 
zeroes. 
And so there was no — there was no modification of 
the child support order in the decree and so the Court would 
find that respondent is not excused from having paid child 
support for the substantial period of time. He's not —he's 
not only excused for not paying it, he's not excused for, in 
any way, of having the ability to pay something. He should 
have paid something during this time and should have 
obtained a modification of the order. 
The Court is influenced by the fact that he's 
evidently law-trained in Germany and should have been able 
to handle this — would have been a fairly simple matter to 
find the resources to file a petition to modify the order. 
So based on those findings, the Court would find 
the respondent in contempt of court for disobeying the — the 
requirement to pay child support. And as a sanction in this 
case, the Court would order that the respondent pay minimum 
payments of $250 per month, first payment due in 30 days, to 
petitioner on this judgment. That — the Court will set a 
review hearing. Respondent can purge his contempt by paying 
off this child support debt. 
The Court would also order that he pay attorneys' 
fees, reasonable attorneys' fees, to — to petitioner. The 
Court would expect an affidavit in compliance with the Rules 
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of Civil Procedure, Rule 73, stating what - what fees are 
claimed. And we'll set a - we'll set a review hearing in 
about 120 days. The issue of that hearing would be whether 
the payments are being made and, if not, whether respondent 
should go to jail as a result. I don't want to — I want to 
give him a chance to voluntarily comply at this point and 
show good faith without sending him to — without imposing a 
jail sentence. But have no doubt that the Court would 
certainly — if payments are not being made, the Court 
would — that would be an issue, whether he should go spend 
time at the Utah County jail. 
So that would be the order of the Court. 
Would you prepare an order to that effect, 
Mr. Starr, and serve that on the respondent? 
MR. STARR: I will. 
THE COURT: And then we'll take it from there. 
And then if you'll — do you have an amount of time — we'll 
set a hearing date here in a moment, but do you have an 
amount of time that you think you can get your affidavit in? 
MR. STARR: Your Honor, I can submit that within a 
week. But also ask that, if we're going to schedule an 
actual hearing date, I'm not sure; I haven't spoken with my 
client, but given her limited resources, she may wish to 
approach that review hearing on her own, and I would ask 
that I be able to withdraw as her counsel prior to that 
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time, if she — 
THE COURT: Well, you - you can — 
MR. STARR: — if she instructs me. 
THE COURT: — you can file a motion to withdraw, 
as appropriate, and then we'll — we'll look at it, okay? 
MR. STARR: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's go out, maybe, 
something like 12 0 days and - what, November something? 
THE CLERK: November 2 9th, at 8:30. 
THE COURT: How about November 2 9th at 8:30? 
MR. TRACY: If I could just power up my calendar, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. TRACY: If I could request a Monday, if Your 
Honor has hearings scheduled for Mondays. 
THE COURT: We would do that on a Monday morning. 
We can do it any time after 8:00 on a Monday. 
THE CLERK: November 2 9th's a Monday. 
THE COURT: 2 9th would be a Monday. 
MR. STARR: That'll work for us, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to do it at 8:30, early, 
or would you rather go later in the morning? 
MR. TRACY: The latest in the afternoon would be 
preferable, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, we quit hearing civil 
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cases at about 11:30. That's when we start mental health 
court. So it'd have to be somewhere between 8:0.0 and 11:30, 
typically. We could do it at 11:00 or 11:15, if you want. 
MR. TRACY: Are hearings scheduled for Fridays, 
Your Honor? 
THE COURT: We can do a hearing on a Friday. 
MR. TRACY: That would be - if it was scheduled 
for a Friday, the time would not matter, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Right. We can set it on a Friday and 
then, if we have a jury trial, we'll just interrupt the jury 
trial to have the hearing. 
THE CLERK: December 3rd. 
THE COURT: So December 3rd? Okay. 
THE CLERK: 2:00? 
THE COURT: Well, why don't we - since it's - why 
don't we say — why don't we say 9:00 and then, if we have a 
jury trial, we can just handle it before we actually seat a 
jury, conduct voir dire. 
THE CLERK: So 9:00? 
THE COURT: 9:00? Okay. Very good. 
All right. Thank you very much then. Court's in 
recess. 
MR. STARR: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the hearing was 
concluded at 11:03 a.m.) 
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